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Introduction
It is ironic that we come to you today with broad recommendations from our Katrina research that
encourage a stronger federal recovery framework and more effective collaboration of federal
representatives with state and local governments when a catastrophe occurs. The irony is due to the
degree that each one of us believes in and is committed to the important role of local, engaged citizens
and the governments who represent them growing in their capacity to achieve disaster resiliency and
safe recovery when disasters do occur. We concur with FEMA Director Fugate‟s position that this
capacity should be built at the local and state level.
However, in the recovery from Katrina, so many problems occurred, opportunities were missed, and
suffering enhanced because of the lack of an organized, systematic response. These shortcomings are
so profound that we feel we have no choice but to recommend the implementation of a comprehensive
strategic federal framework for catastrophic recovery that includes all levels of government. Each sub
study group—Public Assistance, Individual Assistance, and Mitigation came to the same conclusion
independently: A stronger federal role is needed for recovery from a catastrophe because catastrophes
are different from "regular" disasters—they happen too infrequently for any state and its local
governments to have regular experiences with them and thus be able to develop an appropriate welldeveloped response, and they incapacitate the state and local organizational response and recovery
systems that were in place before the event.
We do not recommend that the federal government "send more money." Our recommendations are for
the federal system to make good on its commitments, in the Stafford Act and elsewhere, to develop the
necessary organizational goals and implementation practices to support the state and local response.
For any state in the country and the residents who are in the catastrophe "footprint" to make it through
the experience and to recover well and more safely, the federal government cannot absolve itself from
an important leadership role as the keeper of the knowledge of how to implement a recovery from
catastrophe.
Recovery from future catastrophes in the United States must be compassionate. By this term we mean
that recovery assistance must be delivered rapidly, efficiently and successfully. The spirit of the
Stafford Act and the federal system is for the recovery to be managed by the lowest level of
government possible. In the case of a catastrophe, we argue that the federal government cannot wait to
see how much the state and local governments are able to do and then to fill in what is remaining. The
delay is much too harmful. Assume there will be a need for significant federal involvement, prepare for
it and put the implementation into effect immediately when such an event occurs. The federal
government cannot be distant from the recovery; it must take an active, effective supportive role in
every phase, beyond what occurred in Katrina. We have included an alternative proposal to adopt best
systems-related approaches and practices in the event that the supportive role might be considered
insufficiently capable or mature.
The remaining recommendations are wide ranging. We present them grouped in this summary: Public
Assistance, Human Recovery (Individual Assistance), Mitigation, Systems Response to Critical Risk.
We conclude with the issue of a Catastrophic Annex/Triggers, General/Cross Cutting
Recommendations, with Research Methods of the Project and Acknowledgements. We have available
2
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longer reports for the four—PA, IA, MIT and Systems Approach—that explain why we made the
recommendations that we have made. A full report of the findings including others not related to the
federal role will be available by June 30, 2010.1

Public Assistance Recommendations
Robert Montjoy, Monica Farris, and Joel Devalcourt
Currently, it takes too long and costs too much to put federal dollars into the hands of communities
that need cash quickly to rebuild and recover (Federal Coordinating Officer Scott Wells, 2005).
The key question is how to deliver massive public assistance quickly and ensure that it is used
responsibly. The answer, we think, is much better preparation coupled with selective rule changes for
catastrophes. The Public Assistance (PA) program starts community recovery through emergency
protective measures and debris clearance, followed by restoration of facilities that provide the
infrastructure for communities and their economies. After Katrina and Rita the need for comprehensive
aid, rapidly delivered, was urgent because so many people and facilities were affected. In community
after community there were no viable structures for schools, clinics, etc. without which many people
would not return. We must now focus future preparations on this new level of disaster.
1. Outcome Orientation. What would decisive action after a catastrophe look like?
Issue: The Public Assistance program operates primarily on bureaucratic norms that can delay
recovery after a catastrophe.
Recommendations: Adopt an action orientation through forward funding (in catastrophes only),
pushing decisions down the hierarchy, fixing responsibility and using outcome-based performance
measures.
Rationale: Recovering from a catastrophe is more like fighting a battle than it is like running a
bureaucracy. Battles demand thorough preparation, then prompt, decisive action under conditions of
uncertainty.
2. Human Resources. Catastrophic threats require a broader view of human resource needs.
Issue: FEMA‟s Strategic Human Capital Plan (SHCP) must be completed and staffed, but it does not
cover all levels of government and private firms engaged in the management of the PA program.
Recommendations: Complete the SHCP, develop intergovernmental training, and certify private
companies that manage PA projects (as opposed to those that actually perform the repair or
rebuilding).

1

Contact: slaska@uno.edu to receive an electronic copy.
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Rationale: There were clearly insufficient numbers of trained people at all levels for Katrina/Rita. The
PA program is intergovernmental and requires knowledgeable people at all levels with a shared
understanding of rules and procedures. At the same time, it is not cost-effective for communities to
maintain sufficient trained staff to handle large numbers of cases concurrently. They must be able to
expand capacity for all phases of the process, including: application, contracting, and monitoring. A
cadre of FEMA staff is essential, but most communities must also rely on private firms to assist with
contract management, including the prevention of fraud, waste, and abuse. Certification can help to
ensure standards.
3. Community Preparation. Plans are nothing; planning is everything.- Dwight Eisenhower
Issue: Communities and organizations were not prepared for recovery. As the quotation above
recognizes, it is impossible to predict exactly what will happen in chaotic events, such as battles or
catastrophes, but the process of planning is essential because it forces leaders to face possibilities and
build capacity.
Recommendation: FEMA should provide technical assistance, measure progress, and incentivize
participation. A catastrophic insurance program may have many advantages and should be studied.
Rationale: Inadequate preparation by affected communities hinders recovery. Pre-disaster preparation
requires knowledge, resources, and often the political will to face difficult issues. The federal
government can put the issue on local agendas, provide technical assistance, and reward preparation.
4. Initial Estimates of Scope and Cost. Low or zero-cost estimates led to disagreement and delay in
project approval.
Issue: Initial cost estimates are critically important because they determine eligibility for repairing or
rebuilding, and they set caps on alternate and improved projects.
Recommendation: Create a program to improve cost estimation through pre-disaster documentation,
training of field personnel and regular evaluation of cost-estimation procedures.
Rationale: Distinguishing pre-disaster condition from disaster-related damage was a major challenge
after Katrina/Rita. In many cases PWs were begun with unrealistically low or "0" estimates, leading to
multiple versions, appeals and delays. In addition even carefully applied cost-estimation procedures
may not work well after a catastrophe because of changed market conditions. At present there appears
to be no program to regularly evaluate the accuracy of cost- estimation procedures under varied
circumstances.
5. PW review and approval. Many applicants lacked confidence in the review and approval process.
Issues: Following Katrina/Rita many applicants complained that they could not determine the status of
PW submissions, that documents were lost, that FEMA changed position on project approvals, and that
there was no independent appeal process, all of which led to a lack of confidence in the program.
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Recommendations: Create a user-friendly system for tracking PWs, require FEMA to explain denials
and create an independent appeal process.
Rationale: Transparency increases confidence, and independent reviews can also resolve impasses.
6. Building Back Better. For successful recovery to occur, communities should implement mitigation
and resilience strategies that minimize their risk to hazards and strengthen their ability to withstand
and recover from future disasters (National Disaster Recovery Framework).
Issues: In many cases mitigation was not encouraged as part of the PA program after Katrina/Rita.
Recommendations: See the mitigation section of this report.

Recommendations for Human Recovery:
Case Management, Mental Health and the Role of Non-Profits
Pamela Jenkins, Branda Nowell and Michelle Gremillion
Since August 2005, individuals and families in the Gulf Coast area face enormous challenges to
recovery. After a catastrophe, individuals and families have to build back nearly every facet of their
lives. The multi-dimensionality of their recovery involves a myriad of resources: housing, health care,
employment, schools and day care.2 In this section, we discuss recommendations for the management
of the human recovery. Specifically, we outline recommendations for case management after a
catastrophe, ongoing mental health issues that arise in a long-term recovery and the role of non-profits
(both national and international) in recovery. These topics all address human recovery in some fashion
and are related; yet, we approach each topic as a single issue.

Case Management
Prior to the response to Hurricane Katrina, very little of the case management was documented or
significantly funded (Phillips, 2009). The following recommendations highlight the role of the federal
government in managing lives after a catastrophe. The federal response is improving, but case
management remains a critical issue for long-term recovery.
1. Connecting with the People Who Need Help

Issue: Information about evacuees and their situation (location, health, housing, transportation) was
difficult to obtain. Further, a lack of coordination among case management providers resulted in some
victims not receiving case management and others receiving services from multiple agencies.

2

Housing remains central to recovery. While this section of this report does not include specific recommendations about
housing, the need for housing and the issues of rebuilding are intertwined with the all of recovery issues.
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Recommendations:
1a. Best practices are defined by collaborating strategies and policies, procedures, and other
methods for communicating and working across multiple agencies.
1b. The process of requesting and receiving program/client data from federal partners must be
planned for in advance. As some case data now exist (through multiple sources), it might
be possible to maintain those networks built during Katrina. In the future, data
management should have necessary resources.
Rationale: In the chaos of a catastrophic event, it was very difficult to find evacuees to know for
which program they qualified for. The outreach across the country, but especially in flood ravaged
areas, was not consistent.
2. Navigating Without a Map
Issue: Initial confusion about funding and purpose of case management programs delayed local case
management development. Local agencies had difficulty knowing the parameters of the case
management system to collaborate on the process. The confusion about which clients qualified for
what program and how to obtain that information was staggering.
Recommendations:
2a. Best practices for case management and other strategies should be in place and readily
available as a contingency. The federal government could identify case management
agencies in advance and include them in emergency response planning.
2b. FEMA should facilitate the creation of a central clearing house for information on
assistance programs and services both locally and federally.
Rationale: The service-delivery challenges may have prevented some from receiving consistent help
because of lack of understanding of multiple agencies‟ roles and responsibilities. Service providers
lacked a central repository of information that would help them guide clients through the confusing
array of assistance programs and services available both locally and federally.
3. Bureaucratic Constraints to Getting People the Help They Need

Issue: Case managers faced challenges in meeting client needs due to federal funding rules on direct
assistance. Program eligibility requirements were also a barrier to providing disaster case management.
Some funds were restricted to victims of a specific hurricane. Other guidelines restricted case
management services to residents of FEMA housing only.
Recommendations:
3a. Access to material resources is essential to post-disaster recovery. Case management
programs should have discretionary funds for low-cost unmet recovery needs and allow
local decisions on the use of these funds.
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3b. Eligibility requirements should continue to be reviewed. This is an ongoing discussion of
who should receive case management and the ability to meet the diverse needs of the
population.
Rationale: Case management agencies saw the need for direct financial assistance; yet such assistance
was not always available. Some programs were not allowed to make direct assistance payments, yet
without direct service funds, short-term needs become long-term issues.
4. Closing the Door before Closing the Deal

Issue: The federal government supported Disaster Case Management, but delays, breaks in funding
and time limits hindered assistance. Throughout the response and recovery, there was variability in
application, implementation and outreach to diverse populations.
Recommendation:
4a. Consistent ongoing case protocols should be developed and provide adequate program
periods.
Rationale: Some cases were closed not because clients‟ needs had been met, but because the program
was ending.
5. Working in a Context of Overwhelming Need with Limited Capacity

Issue: Numerous sources noted the high staff turnover among case managers. This workforce problem
creates great instability as clients didn‟t know the name of their current manager. Large caseloads were
barriers to meeting client needs.
Recommendation:
5a. Best practices for case management and other strategies should be in place continuously as
part of sustainability for human recovery in vulnerable areas. The federal government
could identify case management agencies in advance and include them in emergency
response planning.
Rationale: Effective case management requires service providers with adequate and stable staffing to
create consistency and ensure clients receive adequate attention. It also requires agencies that have the
capacity to serve as a bridge horizontally as well as vertically, connecting to both state and federal
systems as well as with local level service providers in order to identify and connect people to the help
they need.

Mental Health
The psychological impacts of extreme disasters include a broad range of symptoms ranging from
simple reactions to serious post traumatic stress disorder. Much of the literature is based on disasters;
the data is emerging slowly about the long-term effects of the recovery from a catastrophe. It is
important to note that in a catastrophe, those supports (for example, family, neighborhood, and faith
based organizations) are greatly diminished.
7
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1. Finding and Keeping Resources for Mental Health in all Stages of a Catastrophe
Issue: Because the issues of mental health in long-term recovery in a catastrophe are not clearly
known, the issues in funding for long-term mental health care are problematic.
Recommendation:
1a. Amend the Stafford Act to allow states the financial flexibility to allocate funds for
continuing treatment of individuals beyond immediate crisis management after disasters.
Rationale: SAMSHA, Medicaid and other funding was confined to certain aspects of the disaster, so
that long-term outreach and counseling are still difficult to provide.
2. Defining an Effective Mental Health System

Issue: After Katrina, an already under-resourced mental health system had to be rebuilt with fewer
people and fewer systems in place.
Recommendation:
2a. Create provisions within the Stafford Act for catastrophic disasters that allow for longer
term outpatient treatment of conditions clearly related to the exposure and recovery issues
associated with the catastrophic event.
Rationale: The reaction to Hurricane Katrina and the recovery created long term stress that goes
beyond the stress of a disaster. Vulnerable populations, especially families with children, faced a
myriad of social stressors that may persist during the long-term recovery phase.
3. Linking Mental Health Recovery to Other Recovery and Social Service Efforts

Issue: Many of the mental health services before the storm were not coordinated well within the
community.
Recommendation:
3a. Facilitate network development and referral protocols among mental health agencies and
other social service agencies before the event.
Rationale: Attempting to collaborate during a catastrophe was too late and too difficult. The protocols
of each individual agency were often difficult to coordinate with those of the other agencies.

Non-Profits, Foundations and ‘Help’
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were a critical part of New Orleans prior to the flooding,
serving as a source of community and neighborhood strength and employment. International, national,
and local NGO‟s were an integral part of the response and ongoing recovery.
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1. Government Remains Ambivalent about the Integration of NGOs in a Coordinated Response

to Disasters
Issue: Broad scale integration of local, national and international NGOs as part of a coordinated
governmental response to catastrophic disasters requires administrative architecture and capacity that
does not currently exist at the Federal and State levels. While there is a formalized structure in local
and national VOADs, much of the government integration of NGOs in disaster response and long term
recovery of the Gulf region is ad hoc without adequate planning before the storm. This has exacerbated
gaps in coordination and ultimately service provision. Growing expectations for nonprofits and NGOS‟
to assist and even play a leadership role in disaster response must be balanced against their own
shortcomings and complexities.
Recommendations:
1a. Further clarify the role of NGOs as part of a coordinated governmental response to
catastrophic disasters in the Stafford Act.
1b. Identify roles that appreciate and reflect the inherent strengths and limitations of NGOs and
are accompanied by provisions for integrated planning and capacity building to ensure
these roles can be fully executed.
Rationale: Because catastrophic disasters which overwhelm the resources and capacity of local, state,
and federal government are infrequent, the capacity for broad scale inclusion of others such as local,
national and international NGOs has not been adequately developed. Relief agencies both national and
international continue to fragment services. NGO roles have not been formalized or integrated into
local and state planning and recovery efforts.
2. Advocacy in a Catastrophe

Issue: Advocacy is a critical element for the individuals and families to negotiate their recovery. Many
of the non-profits and foundations could not find mechanisms to provide resources for advocacy on
behalf of individuals and families.
Recommendations:
2a. Recognize the importance of advocacy organizations in representing the voices of
vulnerable populations and support their inclusion in relief and recovery planning and
decision-making forums.
2b. Identify and support organizations that have existing expertise and legitimacy as advocates
of vulnerable populations.
Rationale: The depth of the need for advocacy was not realized after Hurricane Katrina; there were
many different definitions. Advocacy, however, was needed for many to receive the most basic of
services including housing, food, and health services.
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3. Knowledge about Disaster among Non-Profits and Foundations

Issue: Foundations and national non-profits have the ability to draw national and international
attention to the catastrophe, but many of these groups do not have the knowledge about disasters,
especially recovery that will allow them to utilize best practices in their funding and their services.
Recommendations:
3a. Because vulnerable areas are waiting for the next storm, government programs, national
non-profits and foundations should work with local agencies to provide a set of programs
that will be able to bridge the gap between normal times and those during a disaster.
3b. Provide technical assistance in needs assessment and integrated planning to assist with
social, cultural and structural reconstruction. Create forums for issues of social justice in
the reconstruction process to be addressed.
Rationale: Recovery from catastrophe has a different trajectory than recovery from disasters.
Rebuilding a community after a catastrophic disaster requires unique expertise that many NGOs and
local government agencies likely lack. A great deal of funding was designated for immediate relief, but
funds for recovery are not so available.
4. To Whom and How to Give in a Catastrophe

Issue: With so many different types of groups involved in providing assistance, funders and
organizations were often 'stepping over each other.' Further, as funders struggled to find „whom to
fund,' the knowledge that funders relied on often came from a few sources.
Recommendation:
4a. Identify organizations that are positioned to serve as bridging/coordinating entities between
national and international NGOs, state and local NGOs to aid in linking local needs to state
and national resources. Foundations need to have multiple links on the ground in
vulnerable areas before a major disaster.
Rationale: Too often, the funders found themselves "in a hurry" to do something and funding was
channeled through their existing—and often sparse—networks of local NGOs. Because these service
delivery networks had structural holes, assistance was not adequately distributed.

Recommendations for Hazard Mitigation
Shirley Laska, Earthea Nance, K. C. King & Joel Devalcourt
1. Mitigation as Recovery "Stepchild": A well-off culture (that believes that it can "absorb" disaster
impact) dismisses safety as no one‟s responsibility. States, local communities and individuals can
readily avoid doing anything real about risk and fail when they really want to mitigate it. We strongly
argue to make mitigation more attractive, feasible, and required.

10

Achieving Successful Long-Term Recovery and Safety from a Catastrophe

Recommendations:
1a. Promote and support non-structural mitigation including storm water management as a
growing "green" (resilience) industry including by making a stronger commitment to
mitigation as a unified concept and making federal mitigation programs flexible enough to
handle the actual local risk profile.
1b. Eliminate all local match requirements for mitigation after a catastrophe (HMGP and PA
programs). Couch this in recognition of community contribution to maintenance of
acquired land and consider the requirement to develop a pre-disaster post-disaster
redevelopment plan to reduce risk further.
1c. In a catastrophe, deem the mitigation of already listed/already approved at-risk Repetitive
Loss properties and approved projects in a community‟s Mitigation Plan "cost effective,"
needing no additional calculations or justification.
1d. In catastrophes, mandate federal responsibility for mitigation requiring FEMA to
coordinate with the state to have FEMA work directly with local communities on disasterbased mitigation programs similar to the commitment that currently exists (and
recommendations to enhance it) to assist communities after a catastrophe in damage
assessment, another key action for risk mitigation. Provide additional support to
communities with compounded economic vulnerabilities and synchronize state and federal
approval. Katrina delays were extremely harmful to mitigation.
1e. Add a Mitigation Support Function to the Natural Disaster Recovery Framework in order
to take full advantage of the mitigation prospects post a catastrophe and to promote image
of Mitigation. It is not a fully recognized, valued concept like Emergency Management,
despite the current push for disaster resiliency.
1f. Reinstate the Interagency Hazard Mitigation Team (IHMT) with balanced membership
from federal, state and local membership or require states and counties/communities to
establish their own IHMT for a catastrophe. Have it continue over the duration of the
catastrophe recovery conducting regular assessments of performance of all levels of
government involved, measure achievements and require adjustments to the mitigation
efforts while the recovery is ongoing.
1g. After trigger of a catastrophe or after multiple disaster declarations, require in such
designated counties and large communities that FEMA create a permanent Hazard
Mitigation Office, with strong coordination function, just as an Emergency Management
Office is now required by DHS. Require reporting of mitigation progress. Use these offices
as a pilot for requiring such offices in all communities.
2. Recovery Chaos and Unimaginable Delay: "Homeowners received funding to repair/build their
second floor before their first."
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Recommendations:
2a. In collaboration with state officials experienced in catastrophes and/or multiple disasters,
FEMA officials develop best practices for creation of a state homeowner recovery program
for a catastrophe. The impacted state, especially if it is a smaller state, is a victim of the
catastrophe and is unable to create a successful massive response post event.
2b. Conduct a study to consider using SBA to calculate benefits and distribute recovery funds
(from all federal recovery and mitigation sources) for homeowners in catastrophic disasters
in lieu of creating new state-level process for each catastrophe.
2c. Recognize the incredible trauma of the funding application/ repair/rebuilding process for
homeowners in a catastrophe and support them much more adequately to implement the
application process and the repair/rebuilding steps. Nothing can prepare a homeowner
victim for the experience. Fully acknowledge that and deliver information about the
process they will experience in a usable manner with well-trained professional assistance.
Use mature processes of adaptive management to assure that the information being
communicated and staff knowledge is fully up to date to fit the changing process. This
recommendation is not trivial.3
3. Scope of Structures Protected: FEMA‟s aggressive mitigation advocacy and implementation is
focused heavily on owner-occupied homes while a community is comprised of a range of structures, all
important for its functioning.
Recommendations:
3a. Formulate equally aggressive mitigation advocacy for public buildings, commercial
apartments, commercial buildings, public housing and buildings occupied by social
services such as day care, schools, medical clinics and domestic violence shelters.
3b. Require full enforcement of Executive Order No. 11988 for 1/500 year protection of
critical structures and work to achieve this requirement for other public/commercial and
commercial housing structures. All federal agencies that can play a role in achieving
comprehensive community structure risk reduction should be involved, especially HUD
funding of Public Housing and Section 8.
3c. Revamp Public Assistance implementation to incentivize and guarantee implementation of
mitigation provisions after catastrophes. This includes adequate training of staff to know
when mitigation must be introduced and how to do so effectively. Also the match should
be dropped (see above) and elevation should be permitted (within reason) above the BFE.
4. Scale of Residential Structures Protected: As currently implemented HMGP narrowly
emphasizes reducing the future risk of the pre-storm owners of the homes in the flooded area.
Recommendations:
4a. In a catastrophe allow all homes in flooded areas to qualify for federal elevation funding,
not just those that continue to be owned by the pre-storm owners.
3

See K.C. King‟s “Systems Approach” report as well for more recommendations on this topic.
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4b. To achieve a broader scale of risk reduction (not just one owner-occupied house at a time)
FEMA should encourage use of a combination of eligible HMGP mitigation measures for
risk-reduction benefits in conjunction with home elevation , i.e. support flexibility of postdisaster mitigation efforts to achieve best safety. Interagency Hazard Mitigation Teams
could assist on this.
5. Risk Communication and Mitigation: Lack of adequate access to risk data by the public and by
local public officials.
Recommendation:
5a. Provide local communities with better information about their local risk profiles including
areas affected by dam and levee failures. The public‟s right to know about environmental
risk should extend to free and open access to environmental data, risk-informed
stakeholder decision options and risk modeling software.
6. Pre-Disaster Risk Reduction Goals and Implementation for Post-Disaster Redevelopment
Recommendation:
6a. Require communities to develop post-disaster redevelopment plans pre-disaster in a
manner similar to the currently required mitigation plans.

A Comprehensive Systems Approach to Putting Safety First
K. C. King
Introduction: This topic offers a significantly more radical yet comprehensive path to dealing with the
broader issues uncovered by the Katrina catastrophe. Each issue corresponds to patterns that have been
observed in other domains and each recommendation is based on proven, world class practices. In
many respects this approach applies to both structural and non-structural mitigation and argues that a
single integrated system to address prevention, response and recovery is justified by the consistent
patterns of dysfunctionality and poor performance we found in the current, non-integrated approach.
We believe the focus should be on serving individual residents and their communities to make them
safer from future catastrophes, and to help them respond and recover so that people and communities
survive and prosper.
1. Flood Protection, Response And Recovery Did Not Perform As Systems
Issue: The Corps‟ Interagency Performance Evaluation Team (IPET) found the most egregious short
coming of the pre-Katrina flood protection system was that it was a system “in name only” where a
system is defined as “a combination of interacting elements organized to achieve a stated purpose”.
The IPET strongly recommended a comprehensive systems approach as well as to avoid calling
something a system when it wasn‟t. In contrast, the Dutch have experienced success with local Water
Boards responsible for all aspects of flood protection supported by a national framework based on a
systems approach where real safety is critical.

13
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Recommendation: Adopt resilience systems engineering practices to create appropriately organized,
empowered, integrated all-hazard, safety teams
2. Safety is Not a Shared Goal for Life-Critical National Flood Protection Programs
There is no experience of success in any safety critical arena when these conditions are not achieved.
Recommendation: Create a national hazard safety policy that places safety first.
Rationale: Katrina and now Haiti, illustrate that conventional, non-systems approaches to safetycritical issues tend to yield brittle "systems" that can fail catastrophically. Successes in the
development and sustainment of systems-engineered solutions are models of success under the stress
of combat, space and extreme natural disturbances. Systems engineering features holistic practices that
achieve elusive integration and resilience properties essential where safety is at risk. Its aim is to
establish, operate and continuously improve a system that speaks to 100% of interdependent safety
risks where all decisions by all stakeholders are informed by the total risk for all preparations, failures
and restorations at all scales. It ensures integration and resilience by providing structure and visibility
to all interactions, interfaces and involvement of all stakeholders and all components over the system‟s
life.
3. There Was No Focus On Key Stakeholders
All dimensions of Katrina hazard avoidance, survival and recovery shared a broad lack of focus on key
stakeholders.
Issue: With the exception of SBA, there was little evidence that participants in any of the Katrinarelated activities were aware of or followed best stakeholder-focused practices such as the "voice of the
customer" concepts adopted by world-class practitioners of total quality management. These other
quality-oriented practices, which are widely successful in other public and private sectors where they
are used, were not being used by the Corps, state and federal agencies or local authorities. The direct
consequences of this were: fatally exposed residents; tens of thousands of victims who were placed in
personal nightmares; and residents that consistently made and are making bad decisions about their
safety.
Recommendation: Adopt international standard resilience systems engineering practices to ensure that
stakeholders are identified and their legitimate valued results are delivered by all hazard safety
institutions.
Rationale: Global advances in productivity have resulted in a large part from the innovations
introduce by the total quality community such as the imperative of understanding that quality is
measure by stakeholders. These practices are strongly embedded in the Malcolm Baldrige National
Quality Awards and pervade modern systems engineering.
4. Unacceptable Performance Under Catastrophic Stress
Process performance by most Katrina-related public sector activities failed to deliver results of value to
stakeholder residents such as minimally adequate protection, acceptable levels of chaotic survival and
adequately rational and timely recovery.
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Issue: Stakeholders observed that Katrina-related process performance was not repeatable, nor
qualitatively managed, nor defined, nor quantitatively managed nor optimized. On top of this, there
were gaping omissions and errors in the sorts of processes that would have contributed to success.
Errors and unstable policies were the norm rather than the exception.
Recommendation: Direct that institutions engaged in hazard safety achieve performance excellence
against established and objective criteria.
Reasoning: Because of the inherent stress of catastrophic events, it is essential that institutions be
capable and ready to perform at high levels of quality. The Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award
criteria from the Department of Commerce and Capability Maturity Model, Integrated (CMMI) from
Carnegie Mellon have led to dramatic performance improvements in public and commercial sector.
Baldridge and CMMI predict the types and impacts of problems experienced across the spectrum of
Katrina preparation, response and recovery. Preparation that takes into account failure modes and
effects, comprehensive risk assessment and mitigation management, and establishing a fully shared
vision first are hallmarks of a systems approach and key focuses of resilient systems engineering.
These properties are particularly important in safety critical risks and crisis conditions such as are
found in military doctrine and protocols.
Overall Reasoning: The proposed set of recommendations constitutes adoption of a radical and
sweeping change to current practices relating to hazard safety. This scope of change is justified by the
similarity of faults seen across virtually all Katrina-related agencies ranging from the Corps to FEMA
to HUD to the State and local authorities. All of these faults dramatically affected each and every
victim at a time when they were displaced and confused. These impacts have and continue to be
stretched out over half a decade with lasting effects that will span a lifetime.
There is no easy, painless solution to problems of this depth and scale. Transitioning to a
comprehensive, stakeholder-focused systems approach isn‟t the simplest thing, but it has been done
successfully by world class commercial organizations as well as by the Department of Defense in its
large scale acquisitions. It is common practice among world class enterprises that have safety as an
essential element of competitive survival. Coupled with the other recommendations, only a
comprehensive systems approach will get at the full root causes of the Katrina nightmare.

Catastrophic Annex or Triggers or Nothing?
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita introduced us to a new level of disaster, one which observers are now
labeling a "catastrophe." The Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA) defines
catastrophes in terms of "extraordinary levels of casualties or damage or disruption severely affecting
the population (including mass evacuations), infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, or
government functions in an area." Such disasters are different from lesser incidents, not only because
of the scope of damage and the amount of aid required, but also because the need for swift, decisive
action extends well beyond the initial response into the recovery phase, including long-term recovery.
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Many authorities have called for a fundamentally different approach to catastrophes, a catastrophic
annex that would change the rules for federal assistance. We agree, in part, but the biggest changes
have to come before a catastrophic incident—in the way we prepare for all disasters because we cannot
know how big the next one will be. Essentially, we must build capacity for catastrophes and then
use it as needed depending upon the level of disaster. This is the concept of a scalable response. The
emphasis must be on preparation. We feel equally strongly about using a catastrophe to mitigate risk to
prevent a future catastrophe.
Because recovery programs are intergovernmental, preparation must be intergovernmental, but roles
will vary depending upon the type of preparation. Mitigation planning must take place at the
community and state level—with varying degrees of support from other levels of government. On the
other hand, the federal government has to lead in preparation to manage recovery programs after a
disaster. In a catastrophe it is likely that state and local governments will be overwhelmed and unable
to act effectively. In addition it is not cost-effective to maintain adequate capacity, especially in human
resources, in each state and community. Catastrophes are rare events, and most jurisdictions will never
experience one. The federal government continually gains experience from all disasters in the country
which can be used to bear upon the catastrophe and can move assets where they are most needed.
Thus, for example, FEMA needs a surge force capable of assisting massive numbers of governmental
units concurrently seeking Public Assistance and each submitting large numbers of project worksheets
at the same time.
Once a catastrophe strikes there will be a need for extraordinary assistance, rapidly delivered. The
speed and decisiveness that we expect in emergency operations have to carry over into the
recovery phase. The reason is not only that a great many people are suffering but that delay may
jeopardize recovery itself. Bureaucratic norms with an emphasis on procedural conformity do not
serve us well after a catastrophe. We do need special rules to speed the flow of assistance.
Here we return to the issue of a catastrophic annex. We do not favor a complete new set of procedures
that will disrupt administration and may leave unanticipated gaps. We fear that an annex will appear to
be a panacea and divert attention from the preparation that is needed. Rather, we will propose in our
discussions of individual programs selective measures to push funds proactively into affected areas and
hasten decision making. We also recommend that Congress define more precisely how a catastrophic
declaration can be triggered. The PKEMRA definition is vague, leaving a great deal of discretion to the
Administration and leading to pressures for overuse and inconsistencies over time as have happened
with disaster declarations. There should be one or more triggers or thresholds based on observations,
such as fifty percent damage and evacuation over a broad area. The difference between a trigger and a
threshold is that the former would automatically produce a declaration whereas the later would simply
open the possibility of a declaration, still allowing considerable discretion. A single trigger or threshold
would apply to all programs while multiple triggers could be program-specific. Designing an
appropriate trigger would be a challenge because no one can foresee the variety of events that might
warrant catastrophic designation. For this reason a threshold might strike a better balance between the
desire for clear rules and the need for judgment.
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Cross-Cutting Recommendations
Tom Birkland with team
A theme running through all of our recommendations is that catastrophes are not merely "bigger
disasters." The scope and scale of a catastrophe is much, much larger than the aggregation of several
smaller disasters. Not every disaster will be a catastrophe, so we agree with the fundamental premise
that preparedness, mitigation, and response to most disasters should be undertaken by local
governments. Catastrophes, by definition, overwhelm these governments, so the federal government
must be prepared to address the extreme problems that arise from the most extreme catastrophic
events. Indeed, the creation of the Department of Homeland Security was recognition of this federal
role, and FEMA‟s inclusion in that agency was recognition of the federal role in disaster management.
The promises made to the nation when DHS was created included, implicitly, the idea that the federal
government would serve to fill in gaps when local capacity was overwhelmed by catastrophic terrorism
or a catastrophic natural disaster.
Yet, the following problems make the nation more vulnerable to catastrophic disasters, and place
billions of dollars of property, and many thousands of people, at risk every day. Unclear and
uncoordinated policies, the lack of focus on mitigation, the unwitting creation of risk through unwise
state, local, and federal policies, all makes the likelihood of catastrophic disaster greater than it should
be.
1. Problem 1: The Creation of Risk
Issue: Existing federal policy creates risk or promotes risk taking that works against national hazard
reduction goals
Recommendations:
1a. Any legislation related to economic stimulus, infrastructure, land use, housing, commercial
development, and similar policies should include an assessment of the nature and extent of
any risks created or promoted by the legislation.
2a. Environmental Impact Statements should be required to include discussion of the
relationship between projects, hazard mitigation, and the natural environment.
3a. The federal government should honor commitments to hazard mitigation.
2. Problem 2: The Nature of Hazards
Issue: The nation remains more focused on catastrophic terrorism than catastrophic natural
disasters.
Recommendations:
2a. To the greatest extent possible, emergency management activities—including
preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery—should be promoted under an all17
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hazards framework that recognizes regional variations in risks and hazards. This risk
profile will include terrorism, but we must understand that the risk of catastrophic
terrorism is variable just like the risk of catastrophic disaster is variable.
3. Problem 3: Relief Versus The Other Parts Of The Disaster Cycle
Issue: The federal government is much more committed to disaster relief than it is to mitigation,
support for response, or recovery.
i. Mitigation was a priority under Clinton/Witt. It is no longer a priority
ii. Disaster relief is much more popular politically
Recommendation:
3a. The nation should spend at least as much attention (not money) on preparedness (including
planning), mitigation, and recovery planning as it does to the provision of disaster relief.
Doing so would save money in the long run by reducing relief and recovery expenditures,
thereby helping to meet the president‟s resilience goals.
4. Problem 4: Confused Management and Oversight
Issue: Responsibility for and oversight of federal disaster programs is fragmented and confusing, both
in terms of management and congressional oversight.
Recommendations:
4a. Clarify responsibilities and accountability for particular programs
4b. Balance financial accountability with compassion: State that relief is a moral imperative as
long as governments create or exacerbate risks
4c. Mandate that all disaster preparation, response and recovery actions be integrated across all
agencies and governmental levels from the perspective of victims
Rationale: There are 86 congressional committees with oversight over DHS. There are at least 107
disaster relief programs under the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance (CFDA), of which over 50
are listed as "DHS" programs, even though they should probably be listed under FEMA to comply with
the plain intent of the PKEMRA, which granted greater autonomy to FEMA. Streamlined and
comprehensive oversight will improve coordination, while increased FEMA autonomy will yield better
performance in disasters, as recognized by Congress in the PKEMRA.
Problem 5: Learning—or Not Learning—From Disasters
Issue: Congress and the Executive Branch continue to make the same mistakes after disasters.
"Lessons learned" documents are not always based on actual learning. They are often little more than
lessons "observed," or are congratulatory documents that emphasize what went well while not applying
rigorous analysis to elements where performance can be improved. Furthermore, in disaster after
disaster, and even after the catastrophe that was Katrina, relief received far more attention than did
mitigation or recovery. And, indeed, the progress that had been made in emphasizing mitigation as a
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federal priority after the 1993 Midwest floods was lost beginning in 2001, and was never regained
even after the catastrophic failure of the systems that were supposed to mitigate floods in New Orleans.
Recommendation:
5a. To the greatest extent possible, Congress and the executive branch should learn from
disasters, rather than merely reacting to them. All disasters should be studied by a postdisaster investigation team under FEMA or DHS. Models of such processes include the
Earthquake Engineering Research Institute‟s (EERI) Learning from Earthquakes program
funded by the NSF under the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program (NEHRP),
the NTSB‟s investigations of major aviation and other transport accidents, and NIST‟s
investigation of the collapse of the World Trade Center towers on September 11, 2001.
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Appendix A: Research Methods
Methodology: The design of the methodology for this report is a multiple methods design, using
primary and secondary data. The first part of the design was to review the existing research on
disasters in general and Hurricane Katrina specifically. Major themes were identified through the
literature for all subsections. After the initial review of existing literature, a three day meeting was held
with the advisory team where the initial themes were further discussed and refined. In the next phase,
as many existing reports of Hurricane Katrina and Rita were reviewed in light of the themes
developed.
In the second phase of this project, each subsection team conducted interviews, focus groups
and participant observations with local leaders in each area. Content analysis was conducted on text
from agency plans and reports. Additionally, key informants on disasters were also asked to review the
initial findings. At the end of this phase this interim report was written. In a third and final phase,
recommendations will be presented to all key informants to ensure reliability and validity of findings.
After this review, the final report will be submitted.
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